Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 77

Issue 3

Article 9

Summer 2020

No Injury? No Class: Proof of Injury in Federal Antitrust Class
Actions post-Wal-Mart
Rami Abdallah Elias Rashmawi
Washington and Lee University School of Law, rashmawi.r21@law.wlu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, and the Litigation
Commons

Recommended Citation
Rami Abdallah Elias Rashmawi, No Injury? No Class: Proof of Injury in Federal Antitrust Class
Actions post-Wal-Mart, 77 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1375 (2020).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol77/iss3/9
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

No Injury? No Class: Proof of Injury in
Federal Antitrust Class Actions
post-Wal-Mart
Rami Abdallah Elias Rashmawi *

Abstract
Over the past twenty years the Supreme Court of the United
States has systematically limited the scope of federal class
actions brought under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Importantly, in two landmark decisions, Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes and Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, the
Supreme Court cemented a heightened level of inquiry demanded
by Rule 23, a stringent, “rigorous analysis.”
This Note analyses the effects of this heightened inquiry on
federal antitrust class actions, particularly in situations where
the plaintiffs’ method of proving antitrust injury fails to do so for
some of the putative class members. After the Introduction, Part
II of this Note provides a brief overview of federal antitrust law
and federal class action law, covering the goals and policies of
each. Part III discusses the doctrinal effects of the landmark
Supreme Court decisions in Wal-Mart and Comcast. Part IV
outlines the two standards applied by federal courts in the
pre-Wal-Mart era to assess whether an antitrust plaintiff’s
method of proving injury met the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).
Part V of this Note analyzes these two standards and argues that
*
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the less stringent one did not survive the Supreme Court’s new
post-Wal-Mart “rigorous analysis.” Part V then assesses the
current state of a de minimis exception to the more stringent
standard, analyzing the post-Wal-Mart federal appellate
decisions discussing the exception. Finally, Part VI of this Note
concludes and proposes a framework for assessing proof of
class-wide antitrust injury to accompany the Supreme Court’s
new more exacting class certification standards.
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Introduction

Imagine you are an average consumer (which you probably
are). It is a normal weekday. You wake up and get out of bed.
You brush your teeth, maybe drink a cup of coffee. Imagine that
at some point while you prepare to begin your day, you decide to
turn on the daily news. So, you flip to your favorite television
channel. There, on the news, you see a report stating that the
United States Department of Justice has opened an “antitrust
investigation” into the manufacturer of a product that you
purchase frequently in your day to day life. You hear that the
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manufacturer allegedly engaged in “anticompetitive behavior”
and that you as a consumer suffered from higher prices as a
result. It’s possible that you hardly understand what the report
actually means but nonetheless you think to yourself, “I
purchase that product all the time, can I really do anything to
get money from that company?” While the answer to that
question may theoretically be “yes,” the challenges you must
face to emerge victorious in your federal antitrust action may
prove too tough to take on alone. You may need some help from
a couple of friends, friends who also purchased the same product
from the same company. But unfortunately, pooling resources
can only get you so far—you will likely face other obstacles along
the way.
The federal antitrust laws stand as the primary protection
for the United States free market. 1 Antitrust and competition
law allow for the proper functioning of the economy through
prohibitions on anticompetitive behavior such as monopolies
and cartels. 2 Specifically, the main goal of the American regime
is preventing the improper abuse of market power, which
commonly results in increased prices and negative effects on
consumer welfare. 3 However, in order for this goal to be
achieved, effective enforcement of the antitrust laws is key. 4
While the Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission are the primary enforcers of federal antitrust laws,
private individuals also fulfill a crucial role in their

1. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494, 502 (2015)
(“Federal antitrust law is a central safeguard for the Nation’s free market
structure.”).
2. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 (1963)
(“[C]ompetition is our fundamental national economic policy, offering as it
does the only alternative to the cartelization or governmental regimentation
of large portions of the economy.”); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S.
1, 56–57 (1911) (discussing fears that monopoly would “restrain[] the free flow
of commerce and tend[] to bring about the evils, such as enhancement of prices,
which were considered to be against public policy”).
3. See infra Part II.A (discussing the goals of the federal antitrust laws).
4. See Wayne D. Collins, The Goals of Antitrust: Trusts and the Origins
of Antitrust Legislation, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2279, 2339–42 (2012) (recounting
the early efforts of federal antitrust enforcement).
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enforcement. 5 Through creating a private right of action,
Congress empowered private parties to act as “private attorneys
general” 6 and participate in antitrust enforcement. 7 However,
many issues that decrease the efficacy of this crucial
enforcement are inherent in private antitrust actions and
generally cannot be overcome by a litigant acting alone. 8
Federal class actions, governed by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23, 9 solve some of the common issues that plague
antitrust actions. 10 This is because it is common for antitrust
harms to be spread over a significant amount of consumers, with
the actual harm suffered so miniscule that bringing an
individual claim would be financially unwise. 11 The class
mechanism operates in the context of private antitrust actions
to provide a solution to these issues; however, class certification
is subject to important restrictions contained in Rule 23(a) and
23(b). 12
Proving injury resulting from the alleged antitrust violation
is an essential element of a federal antitrust action. Accordingly,
putative class plaintiffs must put forth a mechanism at the class
5. See Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits from Private
Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 879,
904– 05 (2008) (listing the benefits of private antitrust enforcement).
6. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972).
7. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 422 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (emphasizing
the role of antitrust laws as a “consumer welfare prescription”); Lande &
Davis, supra note 5, at 883 (“[P]rivate enforcement . . . serves to deter
antitrust violations.”).
8. See Lande & Davis, supra note 5, at 881–82 (discussing the issues
that plague private antitrust enforcement).
9. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
10. See Steven B. Pet, Preserving Antitrust Class Actions: Rule 23(b)(3)
Predominance and the Goals of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 12 VA. L. &
BUS. REV. 149, 150–52 (2017) (commenting that class action antitrust
enforcement “advances Congress’s two primary goals in passing Section 4 of
the Clayton Act”).
11. See In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight
III), 934 F.3d 619, 624 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (acknowledging the most common
antitrust class action scenario).
12. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (“Prerequisites.”); id. 23(b) (delineating
additional rules to maintain a class action); see also Pet, supra note 10, at
156– 58 (discussing the benefits and restrictions the class action places on
private antitrust plaintiffs).
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certification stage that proves this injury. 13 Importantly, this
mechanism for proving injury must not frustrate the
predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). 14
Historically, this mechanism for proving class-wide injury
rarely frustrated the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). 15 The
requirements were “readily met in certain cases
alleging . . . violations of the antitrust laws.” 16 Consequently,
many courts were willing to certify classes so long as
“widespread injury to the class” was proven, even if some
individual members of the putative class were found to be
uninjured. 17
However, in the past decade, multiple Supreme Court
decisions drastically altered the landscape of federal class action
law and limited a putative class’ ability to achieve certification.
Importantly, first in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 18 and
13. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 623 (“To establish liability under [the
Clayton Act], each plaintiff must prove not only an antitrust violation, but also
an injury to its business or property and a causal relation between the two.”);
15 U.S.C. § 15 (2018) (“[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue
therefor . . . .”).
14. See Rail Freight III, at 623–24 (“The party seeking class certification
must affirmatively demonstrate that the commonality and predominance
requirements are satisfied.” (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S.
338, 350–51 (2011))).
15. See Pet, supra note 10, at 156–57 (noting that “the predominance
inquiry would only rarely bar class treatment for antitrust plaintiffs”).
16. Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997).
17. See Meijer, Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Holdings Co., 246 F.R.D. 293, 310
(D.D.C. 2007) (“[T]he inability to show injury as to a few does not defeat class
certification where the plaintiffs can show widespread injury to the class.”); In
re NW Airlines Corp. Antitrust Litig., 208 F.R.D. 174, 223 (E.D. Mich. 2002)
(“The ‘impact’ element of an antitrust claim need not be established as to each
and every class member; rather, it is enough if the plaintiffs’ proposed method
of proof promises to establish ‘widespread injury to the class’ as a result of the
defendant’s antitrust violation.”); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 200
F.R.D. 297, 321 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (“Courts have routinely observed that the
inability to show injury as to a few does not defeat class certification where
the plaintiffs can show widespread injury to the class.”); In re NASDAQ Mkt.
Makers Antitrust Litig., 169 F.R.D. 493, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Even if it could
be shown that some individual class members were not injured, class
certification, nevertheless, is appropriate where the antitrust violation has
cause widespread injury to the class.”).
18. 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
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subsequently in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 19 the Court
established and reaffirmed a heightened level of inquiry
demanded by Rule 23, a stringent, “rigorous analysis.” 20
Following the principles set forth in Wal-Mart and Comcast,
many courts have shifted away from the more lenient
“widespread injury” standard and instituted a more stringent
“common proof” standard instead. 21 This standard requires that
injury be shown through “common proof” as to the entire class. 22
Under the “common proof” standard, courts so far are unwilling
to certify classes that contain a large number of uninjured
members. 23 However, these courts signal that even under this
more stringent standard, a de minimis amount of uninjured
class members possibly would not preclude certification. 24 This
Note addresses whether a class action seeking damages under
federal antitrust law can be certified by a federal district court
under Rule 23(b)(3) 25 when the mechanism for proving
class-wide injury fails to show that every single class member
was injured by the alleged antitrust violations.
This Note proceeds as follows. Part II provides a brief
overview of federal antitrust law and federal class action law,
covering the goals and policies of each. Part III discusses the
doctrinal effects of the landmark Supreme Court decisions in
Wal-Mart and Comcast resulting in the shift towards a “rigorous
19. 569 U.S. 27 (2013).
20. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 351 (“[C]ertification is proper only if the
trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule
23(a) have been satisfied.”); Comcast, 569 U.S. at 33 (reiterating the “rigorous
analysis” standard).
21. See e.g., In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail
Freight III), 934 F.3d 619, 624 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“[P]laintiffs . . . must show
that they can prove, through common evidence, that all class members were
in fact injured by the alleged conspiracy.”).
22. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 311 (3d
Cir. 2008) (“[T]he task for plaintiffs at class certification is to demonstrate that
the element of antitrust impact is capable of proof at trial through evidence
that is common to the class rather than individual to its members.”).
23. See infra Part V.B (analyzing courts that apply the “common proof”
standard).
24. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 624 (determining whether the de
minimis exception would encompass a large number of uninjured class
members).
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
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analysis” at the class certification stage. Part IV outlines the
two standards applied by courts in the pre-Wal-Mart era to
assess whether an antitrust plaintiff’s method of proving
class-wide injury met the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). Part IV
emphasizes the differing results of each standard in regard to
the presence of uninjured class members.
Part V of this Note analyzes these two standards and
argues that the less stringent of those standards did not survive
the Supreme Court’s new post-Wal-Mart “rigorous analysis”
approach to class certification. Part V then assesses the current
state of a de minimis exception, recounting the post-Comcast
appellate decisions discussing the exception. Finally, Part V
assesses the factors that courts find applicable in finding an
amount of uninjured class members to be de minimis. Part VI of
this Note concludes and proposes a framework for assessing
proof of class-wide antitrust injury to accompany the Supreme
Court’s new more exacting class certification standards.
II.

Federal Antitrust Class Actions
A.

Federal Antitrust Law

At the dawn of the twentieth century, the United States
federal government undertook to protect against the
accumulation and improper abuse of market power. 26 Beginning
with the Sherman Act of 1890, 27 and continuing through the
Clayton Act of 1914, 28 Congress continuously took steps to
26. See Collins, supra note 4, at 2339–42 (recounting the early history
and emergence of federal antitrust and competition law); Barak Orbach, The
Goals of Antitrust: How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2253,
2262 (2013) (“Senator Sherman, the drafters of the Sherman Act, and other
lawmakers unequivocally expressed a desire to fight trusts and combinations
through legislation.”); Rudolph J. Peritz, Frontiers of Legal Thought I: A
Counter-History of Antitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 263, 269–71 (1990)
(describing the history and original principles underlying early antitrust
regulation and enforcement); see also ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW,
MARKET POWER HANDBOOK ix (2d ed. 2012) (“[A]t its core, antitrust policy is
aimed at preventing firms from obtaining, maintaining, or utilizing market
power.”).
27. 26 Stat. 209 (codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018)).
28. Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27; 29
U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2018)).
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empower the government to curtail the rise and hegemony of
monopolies and trusts in the United States. 29
Drafted in the shadow of what was popularly known at the
time as “ruinous,” “destructive,” or “excessive” competition, 30
the Sherman Act resolves that “[e]very contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade
or commerce . . . is hereby declared to be illegal” 31 and further
punishes “every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce.” 32 In enacting
the prohibitions contained in the Sherman Act, “Congress
mandated competition as the lodestar by which all must be
guided in ordering their business affairs.” 33 The Sherman Act
stands as an essential truss in the nation’s free market
structure. 34
While federal antitrust law draws its authority from these
statutes, the regime established by Congress is commonly
understood as “little more than a congressional mandate to

29. See N. Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (“The Sherman
Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at
preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.”); Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 56–57 (1911) (discussing fears that
monopoly would “restrain[] the free flow of commerce and tend[] to bring about
the evils, such as enhancement of prices, which were considered to be against
public policy”).
30. See Collins, supra note 4, at 2290 (recounting anticompetitive
behavior that existed prior to the Sherman Act).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
32. Id. § 2.
33. City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 406 (1978).
34. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494, 502 (2015)
(“Federal antitrust law is a central safeguard for the Nation’s free market
structure.”); E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING
ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 4–5 (6th ed. 2014) (“Antitrust
law . . . is a body of law that seeks to assure competitive markets through the
interaction of sellers and buyers in the dynamic process of exchange . . . .”);
United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 (1963) (“[C]ompetition is
our fundamental national economic policy, offering as it does the only
alternative to the cartelization or governmental regimentation of large
portions of the economy.”); Phila. Taxi Ass’n v. Uber Techs., Inc., 886 F.3d 332,
338 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Competition is at the heart of the antitrust laws.”).
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develop a federal common law of competition.” 35 The Sherman
Act’s natural susceptibility to common law interpretation rivals
even that of the U.S. Constitution itself. 36 Consequently, the
Supreme Court took it upon itself at an early stage to mold the
contours of the emerging federal competition law through
numerous decisions interpreting the bounds of the federal
statutes. 37 For instance, although the Sherman Act’s prohibition
on “every contract . . . in restraint of trade or commerce” 38 seems
all-encompassing, the Supreme Court construes it as
“precluding only those contracts or combinations which
‘unreasonably’ restrain competition.” 39 This construction of the
statute became known as the “rule of reason.” 40 The nature of
the Sherman Act as an adaptable and flexible “charter of

35. Peritz, supra note 26, at 269; see Collins, supra note 4, at 2340 (“The
appeal of the common law to the framers of the Sherman Act resided in . . . the
fact that the law could be adjusted by the courts using the common law process
continuously through time to cope with new, emerging business practices.”);
Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 57–58 (noting that the “trend of legislation and
judicial decision came more and more to adapt the recognized restrictions to
new manifestations of conduct” to best prevent “the wrongs which it had been
the purpose to prevent from the beginning”).
36. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933)
(“As a charter of freedom, the [Sherman] Act has a generality and adaptability
comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions.”).
37. See, e.g., Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 59 (“Let us consider the language
of the first and second sections, guided by the principle that where . . . had a
well-known meaning at common law . . . they are presumed to have been used
in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary.”); United States v.
Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179–80 (1911) (applying the “rule of reason” to
construe the words “restraint of trade” so as not to “destroy the individual
right to contract and render difficult if not impossible any movement of trade
in the channels of interstate commerce”); Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246
U.S. 231, 238–39 (1918) (reading the “rule of reason” into the Sherman Act to
determine that a restraint of trade must be unreasonable to trigger the Act).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
39. N. Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (quoting Bd. of
Trade, 246 U.S. at 238).
40. See, e.g., Peritz, supra note 26, at 269–71 (describing the early
disagreement between proponents of the “rule of reason” and the proponents
of “literalism”); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911) (“[I]n
every case where it is claimed that an act or acts are in violation of the statute
the rule of reason, in the light of the principles of law and the public policy
which the act embodies, must be applied.”).
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freedom” 41 is one of its greatest attributes. 42 Accordingly, the
enforcement and interpretation of the federal antitrust statutes
are subject to constant contemporary revision. 43
However, while the prohibitory sections of the Sherman Act
took crucial steps toward empowering the federal government
to protect the free market and specifically consumer welfare, 44
the private enforcement provisions of Section 7 of the Sherman
Act and Section 4 of the Clayton Act empowered ordinary
individuals to participate in the enforcement of the antitrust
laws. 45 These provisions, collectively codified in 15 U.S.C.
§ 15(a), state that “any person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold
the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit.” 46 Multiple
rationales justify private enforcement of the federal antitrust
laws. 47 One important goal of private enforcement is for victims
to recoup losses sustained as a result of illegal anticompetitive

41. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940).
42. See Collins, supra note 4, at 2340 (“The appeal of the common law to
the framers of the Sherman Act resided in . . . the fact that the law could be
adjusted by the courts using the common law process continuously through
time to cope with new emerging business practices.”).
43. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 887,
899 (2007) (“Just as the common law adapts to modern understanding and
greater experience, so too do the Sherman Act’s prohibitions on ‘restraint[s] of
trade’ evolve to meet the dynamics of present economic conditions.”).
44. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 422 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (emphasizing
that the antitrust laws are a “consumer welfare prescription”); Broadcom
Corp. v. Qualcom, Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 308 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The primary goal of
antitrust law is to maximize consumer welfare by promoting competition
among firms.”).
45. See Collins, supra note 4, at 2341–42 (recounting the legislative
discussion regarding providing “an inducement to bring what were likely to be
expensive risky law suits”); 21 Cong. Rec. 2569 (1890) (statement of Sen.
Sherman) (expressing concern that even double damages are “too small” to
induce private enforcement).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2018).
47. See Lande & Davis, supra note 5, at 881–83 (discussing “the purposes
of private enforcement and private remedies”).
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behavior. 48 Moreover, private enforcement “prevent[s] wealth
transfers from these victims to firms with market power.” 49
Perhaps more importantly, private enforcement also serves to
deter antitrust violations at the outset, 50 despite the relatively
few cases that actually render a judgment against the
defendant. 51 In granting a private right of action, Congress
deputized antitrust victims to act as “private attorneys
general,” 52 crucially supplanting the enforcement efforts of the
government by encouraging private litigation in the public
interest. 53
To prevail on an antitrust claim, a civil antitrust plaintiff
must establish three elements: an antitrust violation, causation,
and impact or damage. 54 Accordingly, courts analyzing antitrust
48. See Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10
(1976) (“Treble-damages antitrust class actions . . . [were] conceived of
primarily as a remedy for the people of the United States as individuals,
especially consumers . . . .”); Reiter, 442 U.S. at 343 (noting that the civil
remedy provision was passed “as a means of protecting consumers from
overcharges resulting from price fixing”).
49. Lande & Davis, supra note 5, at 882.
50. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746–47 (1977) (recognizing
the goal of “deterring violators and depriving them of the fruits of their
illegality” reflected in the antitrust laws); Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968) (refusing to interpret the antitrust laws to
allow “those who violate [them] by price fixing or monopolizing [to] retain the
fruits of their illegality because no one [would be] available who would bring
suit against them”).
51. See Lande & Davis, supra note 5, at 883 (“Antitrust verdicts that
produce treble damages are rare, and we believe that few, if any, of the many
antitrust cases that settle do so for more than single damages.”).
52. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972).
53. See Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 746 (recognizing the important
“legislative purpose in creating a group of ‘private attorneys general’ to enforce
the antitrust laws” (quoting Hawaii, 405 U.S. at 262)); Lande & Davis, supra
note 5, at 905 (emphasizing that private enforcement “often
substitute[s] . . . federal and state action entirely when the government did
not act at all or did not achieve meaningful results” and furthermore routinely
“complement[s] governmental enforcement in many situations”).
54. See In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 136
(2d Cir. 2001) (outlining the “three required elements of an antitrust claim”);
Cordes & Co. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. A. G. Edwards & Sons, 502 F.3d 91, 105 (2d
Cir. 2007) (“The three required elements of an antitrust claim are (1) a
violation of antitrust law; (2) injury and causation; and (3) damages . . . .”); 15
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claims frequently break up the claim into three categories: “(1)
a violation of the antitrust laws; (2) individual injury resulting
from that violation; and (3) measurable damages.” 55 Proving
each element of an antitrust claim frequently requires large
amounts of resources that are typically unavailable to the
average consumer affected by anticompetitive behavior. 56 For
the goals of private antitrust enforcement to be realized,
individuals must be capable of amassing enough resources to
challenge the large corporations that typically engage in
violations of the antitrust laws. 57
B.

Antitrust Class Actions under Federal Law

The representative class action constitutes one of the most
contentious weapons in the antitrust plaintiff’s arsenal. 58 The
class mechanism takes steps to rectify the imbalance of
resources that commonly plague antitrust claims made on an

U.S.C. § 15 (2018) (“[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue
therefor . . . .”).
55. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir.
2008).
56. See Lande & Davis, supra note 5, at 883 (noting the “difficulty of
bringing suit” inherent in every private antitrust action).
57. See id. at 905 (“These private attorneys general . . . lawyers
representing businesses, farmers, individuals, . . . often work thousands of
hours and lay out millions of dollars in the course of prosecuting antitrust
litigation . . . .”).
58. See David Inkeles, In re Deepwater Horizon and the Need to Clean Up
Rule 23(b)(3) Certification Jurisprudence Through Legislation, 23 J.L. & POL’Y
741, 750 (2015) (discussing the pleading requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) in the
context of the presence of individual injuries and the need for legislative action
in this sphere); Paul G. Karlsgodt & Dustin M. Dow, The Practical Approach:
How the Roberts Court Has Enhanced Class Action Procedure by Strategically
Carving at the Edges, 48 AKRON L. REV. 883, 890 (2015) (discussing the
practical impacts of the Roberts Court’s class-action jurisprudence on
application of the requirements of Rule 23); Robert H. Klonoff, The Future of
Class Actions: The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 792
(2013) (“When (b)(3) was first introduced in 1966, it was considered ‘the most
controversial portion’ of modern Rule 23.”).
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individual basis. 59 Additionally, although there exists a notable
body of state level antitrust class action jurisprudence and
legislative activity, 60 the federal courts retain exclusive
jurisdiction over federal antitrust claims. 61 Consequently, the
bulk of antitrust class actions take place under federal class
action law governed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 62
In order to certify any kind of class action under federal law,
the putative class of plaintiffs must “affirmatively satisfy” the
mandatory requirements enumerated in Rule 23(a) as well as
the applicable requirements of Rule 23(b). 63 Rule 23(a) outlines
four prerequisites that must be satisfied by every federal class

59. See California v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701–02 (1979) (“[T]he Rule
23 class-action device was designed to allow an exception to the usual rule that
litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.”);
Klonoff, supra note 58, at 731 (recognizing the class action device as a
“revolutionary vehicle for achieving mass justice”); see also Pet, supra note 10,
at 173 (discussing the benefits and criticisms of class actions in the antitrust
context and scrutinizing Rule 23’s heavy requirements).
60. See Stephen Calkins, Perspectives on State and Federal Antitrust
Enforcement, 53 DUKE L.J. 673, 694–96 (2003) (analyzing and outlining the
comparative advantages of the state and federal antitrust enforcement
schemes); see generally ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, STATE ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT HANDBOOK (2d ed. 2008).
61. See 15 U.S.C. § 4 (2018) (“The several district courts of the United
States are hereby invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations
of this act . . . .”).
62. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (“Class actions.”); ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST
LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 855 (Jonathan I. Gleklen et al. eds., 7th
ed. 2012) (noting that class actions under federal law represent the majority
of antitrust class actions).
63. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013) (“[A] party
seeking to maintain a class action must affirmatively demonstrate his
compliance with Rule 23.” (citing Wal-Mart Store, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338,
350 (2011))).
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action: numerosity, 64 commonality, 65 typicality, 66 and adequacy
of representation. 67
Rule 23(b)(3) demands the satisfaction of two additional
requirements: “predominance” 68 and “superiority.” 69 Because
the superiority requirement rarely serves as a bar to
certification, 70 the predominance requirement stands as the
primary hurdle which a putative plaintiff class must surmount
to gain certification. 71 To satisfy the predominance requirement,
a plaintiff class must prove that, in looking to the class as a
whole, issues “common” to the class predominate over issues
specific to individual class members. 72 In the context of Rule 23,
“a common question is one that is capable of class-wide
64. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (requiring that “the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable” (emphasis added)).
65. See id. (a)(2) (requiring that “there are questions of law or fact
common to the class” (emphasis added)).
66. See id. (a)(3) (requiring that “the claims or defenses of the
representatives are typical of the claims or defenses of the class” (emphasis
added)).
67. See id. (a)(4) (requiring that “the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class” (emphasis added)).
68. See id. (b)(3) (requiring that “the questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members” (emphasis added)).
69. See id. (requiring that “a class action [be] superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy” (emphasis
added)).
70. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 62, at 859 (discussing
the superiority requirement).
71. See Pet, supra note 10, at 157–58 (acknowledging the “elaborate
showing from plaintiffs” demanded by courts before finding predominance
satisfied); Blades v. Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562, 574 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming
denial of class certification for failure to meet predominance); In re Asacol
Antitrust Litig., 907 F.3d 42, 62 (1st Cir. 2018) (reversing the lower court and
decertifying the class for failure to meet predominance); In re New Motor
Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 29–30 (1st Cir. 2008)
(remanding the case to the lower court for reconsideration of the predominance
requirement).
72. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring that the court find that “the
questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members”); see also Comcast, 569 U.S. at
33 (reiterating the standard contained in the text of 23(b)(3)); Asacol, 907 F.3d
at 51 (“[C]ommon issues must predominate over individual issues in order to
certify a class.”).
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resolution,” 73 while an individual one is a question for which
“members of the proposed class will need to present evidence
that varies from member to member.” 74
While the goals of the class action mechanism rest in
empowering the plaintiff class, 75 the aim of the predominance
inquiry is to determine whether the aggregation of the claims of
individual class members can be dealt with in a manner that is
efficient and fair. 76 The predominance requirement assures that
the class will be “sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication
by representation.” 77 Further, predominance requires courts to
refrain from “attempt[ing] to eliminate inefficiency by
presuming to do away with the rights a party would customarily
have to raise plausible individual challenges on [certain]
issues.” 78
Prior to the Court’s class action jurisprudence of the past
two decades, 79 the Court readily admitted that predominance
was typically easily satisfied in antitrust class actions. 80
However, the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence reflects a

73. In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight III),
934 F.3d 619, 622 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564
U.S. 338, 350 (2011)).
74. Id. (citing Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045
(2016)).
75. See Chelsey E. Turner, Class Actions: How Easy are They to Bring,
and Why?, 22 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADV. 193, 196–97 (2017) (recounting
the various policies underlying the class action mechanism).
76. See Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 470
(2013) (noting that the predominance requirement would reject “a case in
which the asserted [common issue] . . . exhibits some fatal dissimilarity
among class members that would make use of the class-action device
inefficient or unfair”); Asacol, 907 F.3d at 51 (“Inefficiency can be pictured as
a line of thousands of class members waiting their turn to offer testimony and
evidence on individual issues.”).
77. Amgen, 568 U.S. at 470 (citing Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591, 623 (1997)).
78. Asacol, 907 F.3d at 51–52.
79. See infra Part III (discussing the effects on the predominance
requirement of the past two decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence).
80. See Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997)
(“Predominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging . . . violations of
the antitrust laws.”).
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fundamental adjustment to the predominance standard in the
context of federal class actions.
III. The “Rigorous Analysis”: Wal-Mart and Comcast
In the past decade, the Supreme Court heavily engaged in
interpreting the contours of Rule 23. 81 The Court handed down
numerous major decisions spanning almost every aspect of class
action law during this period. 82 However, “much commentary
regarding the Court’s tolerance for class actions has turned on
its decisions affecting class certification standards.” 83 Beginning
in 2011 with the landmark case of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 84 and continuing in 2013 with Comcast Corp. v.
Behrend, 85 the Court dramatically changed the landscape of
federal class-action certification. 86 Specifically, this shift
drastically heightened the standard that a putative plaintiff
class must meet when attempting to achieve certification. 87 The
Court adopted a “rigorous analysis” at the class certification

81. See Karlsgodt & Dow, supra note 58, at 884 (noting that in 2009 “the
Court began to grant certiorari over a group of cases that are widely perceived
as changing the landscape of class litigation”); John Campbell, Unprotected
Class: Five Decisions, Five Justices, and Wholesale Change to Class Action
Law, 13 WYO. L. REV. 463, 463 (2013) (“[The changes by the Supreme Court]
so alter accepted paradigms that a class action attorney who retired in 2009
would be almost useless today.”).
82. See generally Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S.
662 (2010); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S.
27 (2013); Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66 (2013).
83. Karlsgodt & Dow, supra note 58, at 906.
84. 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
85. 569 U.S. 27 (2013).
86. See Karlsgodt & Dow, supra note 58, at 906 (noting the “seemingly
severe limitations that [Wal-Mart] placed on plaintiffs’ abilities to certify
classes, followed by Comcast’s even tighter squeeze”); Klonoff, supra note 58,
at 778 (discussing the effects of Wal-Mart on Rule 23(b)(3) class actions).
87. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 342 (“We consider whether the certification
of the plaintiff class was consistent with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a)
and (b)(2).”); Comcast, 569 U.S. at 29 (“We consider whether certification was
appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).”).
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stage. 88 Importantly, this heightened analysis applied not only
to the Court’s understanding of the commonality requirement of
Rule 23(a), 89 but also the predominance requirement of Rule
23(b)(3). 90
A.

Wal-Mart

The underlying suit in Wal-Mart concerned 1.5 million
former and current female employees of Wal-Mart who alleged
that managers in local stores systematically discriminated
against women. 91 The crux of the plaintiffs’ argument was that
Wal-Mart’s lack of a consistent policy on pay and promotion
combined with an inherent “corporate culture” bias against
women produced gender-based discrimination at the stores. 92
The plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart’s pay and promotion
practices “violat[ed] . . . Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.” 93 Accordingly, the plaintiffs demanded “injunctive and
declaratory relief, punitive damages, and backpay.” 94 In support
of their claim, the plaintiff class produced extensive data
indicating that the “pay and promotion disparities at Wal-Mart
could be explained only by gender discrimination” even when
the expert “controlled for factors including . . . job performance,

88. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350–51 (“[C]ertification is proper only if
the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of
Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.”(citations omitted)); Comcast, 569 U.S. at 33
(same).
89. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350–52 (heightening the standard of the
commonality requirement).
90. See Comcast, 569 U.S. at 34 (extending the “same analytical
principles” from Wal-Mart to Rule 23(b)(3)).
91. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 343 (“The named plaintiffs in this lawsuit,
representing the 1.5 million members of the certified class, are three current
or former Wal-Mart employees who allege that the company discriminated
against them on the basis of their sex . . . .”).
92. Id. at 344 (describing the plaintiffs’ claim that “local managers’
discretion over pay and promotions [was] exercised disproportionately in favor
of men”).
93. Id. at 343.
94. Id. at 345.

1392

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1375 (2020)

length of time with the company, and the store where an
employee worked.” 95
The plaintiffs sought class certification under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), 96 which the district court granted, 97
and a divided en banc court of appeals substantially affirmed. 98
The Supreme Court then granted Wal-Mart’s subsequent
petition for certiorari on the issue of “whether the class
certification ordered under Rule 23(b)(2) was consistent with
Rule 23(a).” 99 The Supreme Court answered the question in the
negative, reversed the court of appeals, 100 and decertified the
plaintiff class. 101 In a majority opinion by Justice Scalia, the
Court ruled that the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a) was
not satisfied because of the potentially differing questions
underlying each putative class member’s claims. 102
In coming to its conclusion, the Court delineated a
particularly stringent standard for commonality, stating that
“[c]ommonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the
class members ‘have suffered the same injury.’” 103 Importantly,
the Court held that the “common contention . . . must be of such
a nature that it is capable of class-wide resolution—which
means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an
issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in

95. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 372 (2011) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
96. See id. at 345–46 (majority opinion) (noting that the putative class
relied on Rule 23(b)(2)).
97. Id. at 347.
98. Id.
99. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 562 U.S. 1091 (2010) (granting
certiorari).
100. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 347 (describing the position of the district
court and the court of appeals “that respondents’ evidence of commonality was
sufficient” to satisfy Rule 23(a)).
101. Id. at 367.
102. See id. at 352 (“Without some glue holding the alleged reasons for all
those decisions together, it will be impossible to say that examination of all
the class members’ claims for relief will produce a common answer to the
crucial question why was I disfavored.” (emphasis in original)).
103. Id. at 349–50 (citing Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157
(1982)).
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one stroke.” 104 Further, and most impactful to the Court’s shift
at the class certification stage overall, the majority noted that
“certification is proper only if the trial court is satisfied, after a
rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been
satisfied . . . .” 105 This “rigorous analysis” will often “entail some
overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim.” 106
Although the “rigorous analysis” language was briefly
mentioned by the Supreme Court previously, 107 Wal-Mart
represented a clear shift in the Court’s understanding of the
commonality requirement away from the relatively light burden
imposed by most lower courts at the class certification stage. 108
“[W]hat used to be a foregone conclusion now require[d] some
analysis,” 109 as the Court spoke broadly about the standard that
Rule 23 generally imposed on a putative plaintiff class. 110 “A
party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate
his compliance with the Rule,” 111 signaling that litigants would
not have to wait long before they witnessed a decision applying
the “rigorous analysis” to the other parts of Rule 23.
B.

Comcast

This application came just a year after Wal-Mart, when the
Court heard arguments in another class certification case,
104. Id. at 350.
105. Id. 350–51 (emphasis added).
106. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 351 (2011).
107. See Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982) (“[A] Title
VII class action, like any other class action, may only be certified if the trial
court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a)
have been satisfied.”).
108. Compare Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting
that because the commonality requirement “may be satisfied by a single
common issue, it is easily met”), Hochstadt v. Bos. Sci. Corp. 708 F. Supp. 2d
95, 102 (D. Mass. 2010) (“The threshold of commonality is not a difficult one
to meet.”), and Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1986)
(“The threshold of commonality is not high.” (internal quotations omitted)),
with Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 355 (requiring that plaintiffs present “significant
proof” that the commonality requirement was satisfied).
109. Karlsgodt & Dow, supra note 58, at 910.
110. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350–51 (noting that “Rule 23 does not set
forth a mere pleading standard” and is instead a “rigorous analysis”).
111. Id. at 350.
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Comcast. In Comcast, roughly two million Comcast customers
sought damages for Comcast’s alleged violation of antitrust
laws. 112 The plaintiffs asserted that Comcast’s anticompetitive
behavior in the television market resulted in higher prices for
consumers. 113 Further, the plaintiffs moved to certify a class
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(b)(3). 114
The class plaintiffs put forth several theories to establish
that Comcast’s actions impacted and injured the putative
class, 115 including that “Comcast’s activities reduced the level of
competition from ‘overbuilders,’ companies that build competing
cable networks in areas where an incumbent cable company
already operates.” 116 The district court accepted the
“overbuilder” theory of antitrust impact as “capable of
class-wide proof,” 117 and certified the class, finding that “the
damages resulting from overbuilder-deterrence impact could be
calculated on a class-wide basis.” 118 On appeal, Comcast
challenged class certification, arguing that the class failed to
satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) as the method of proof
“did not isolate damages resulting from any one theory of
antitrust impact,” 119 and essentially “failed to disaggregate
damages from the one accepted theory of harm (the overbuilder

112. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 30 (2013) (“The named
plaintiffs . . . are subscribers to Comcast’s cable-television services . . . [who]
claim[] that [Comcast] entered into unlawful swap agreements, in violation of
§ 1 of the Sherman Act, and monopolized or attempted to monopolize services
in the cluster, in violation of § 2.”).
113. See id. (“[Comcast’s] clustering scheme, [plaintiffs] contented,
harmed subscribers in the Philadelphia cluster by eliminating competition
and holding prices for cable services above competitive levels.”).
114. Id.
115. See id. at 31 (summarizing the plaintiffs’ “proposed four theories of
antitrust impact”).
116. Id.
117. Id.; see Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 264 F.R.D. 150, 174 (E.D. Pa. 2010)
(“We conclude, with one caveat, that the Class has met its burden to
demonstrate that the anticompetitive effect of clustering on overbuilder
competition is capable of proof at trial through evidence that is common to the
class.”).
118. Comcast, 569 U.S. at 31.
119. Id. at 32.
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theory) from the other (rejected) theories of harm.” 120 The Third
Circuit rejected Comcast’s argument, finding that the attack on
the plaintiffs’ methodology was improper at the class
certification stage. 121
The Supreme Court, in another opinion by Justice Scalia
(again writing for a five justice majority) reversed and
decertified the class. 122 Justice Scalia began by repeating the
broad characterizations of the inquiry mandated by Rule 23 that
he had espoused in Wal-Mart. 123 The Court emphasized that
Rule 23 is a “rigorous analysis” that a court must seriously
engage in at the class certification stage, 124 reiterating that
“such an analysis will frequently ‘overlap with the merits of the
plaintiff’s underlying claim.’” 125 However, while in Wal-Mart
Justice Scalia had his sights set on the requirements of Rule
23(a), 126 this time he settled with Rule 23(b)(3) in his
crosshairs. 127 Justice Scalia declared that “[t]he same analytical
principles [that govern Rule 23(a)] govern Rule 23(b).” 128 Even
123F

124F

125F

126F

127F

128F

120. Pet, supra note 10, at 163.
121. See Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182, 206 (3d Cir. 2011) (“At
the class certification stage we do not require that plaintiffs tie each theory of
antitrust impact to an exact calculation of damages, but instead that they
assure us that if they can prove antitrust impact, the resulting damages are
capable of measurement . . . .”).
122. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 38 (2013) (reversing the lower
courts and decertifying the class); see id. at 34 (“Respondents’ class action was
improperly certified under Rule 23(b)(3).”).
123. Id. (“To come within the exception, a party seeking to maintain a class
action ‘must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance’ with Rule 23.” (quoting
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 654 U.S. 338, 350 (2011))); see id. (“The Rule
does not set forth a mere pleading standard.” (internal quotations omitted)).
124. See id. (“[C]ertification is proper only if the trial court is satisfied,
after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been
satisfied.” (internal quotations omitted)).
125. Id. at 33–34; see id. at 34 (recognizing that “class determination
generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal
issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action”).
126. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011)
(discussing the requirements of Rule 23(a)).
127. See Comcast, 569 U.S. at 34–38 (applying the “rigorous analysis” of
Wal-Mart to class certification under Rule 23(b)(3)).
128. Id. at 34.
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further, “[r]ule 23(b)(3)’s predominance criterion is even more
demanding than Rule 23(a).” 129
Abiding by this “rigorous analysis,” the Court engaged in an
assessment of the underlying validity of the plaintiffs’ method
of damage calculations. 130 As a standard, the Court stated that
in the context of an antitrust class action the putative plaintiff
class’ “calculation[s] need not be exact . . . but at the
class-certification stage (as at trial), any model supporting a
‘plaintiff’s damages case must be consistent with its liability
case, particularly with respect to the alleged anticompetitive
effect of the violation.’” 131 Because “the model [did] not even
attempt to do that, [the plaintiffs] cannot possibly establish that
damages are susceptible of measurement across the entire class
for purposes of Rule 23(b)(3).” 132 The Court rejected the
interpretations of the lower courts, concluding that they would
essentially “reduce 23(b)(3) to a nullity.” 133
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Wal-Mart and Comcast
collectively establish and reaffirm the current standard that
Rule 23(b)(3) demands at class certification, the “rigorous
analysis.” 134 Pertinently, the Court seems to suggest that
damages calculations must now be done prior to class
certification and that district courts must delve into the merits
of an expert’s relevant calculating mechanism at the class
certification stage, long before trial. 135 On its face, this may
seem like a straightforward proclamation, but the question
129. Id. (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623–24
(1997)).
130. See id. at 35–37 (analyzing the plaintiffs’ method of proving damages
and determining whether it satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3)).
131. Id. at 35 (quoting ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, PROVING
ANTITRUST DAMAGES: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES 57, 62 (2d ed. 2010)).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 36; see id. (“Under that logic, at the class-certification stage any
method of measurement is acceptable so long as it can be applied classwide,
no matter how arbitrary the measurements may be.” (emphasis in original)).
134. See Karlsgodt & Dow, supra note 58, at 914 (noting the Court’s
“helpful tone emphasizing the need for a rigorous analysis to ensure that the
plaintiff can prove common issues through common evidence”).
135. See id. at 915 (“The Comcast decision . . . seem[s] to suggest . . . that
district courts are required to consider the merits of an expert at the class
certification phase.”).
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remains: if a court is to engage in such a “rigorous analysis,”
how will a court know when a putative class has satisfied it in
the context of antitrust injury?
IV. Antitrust Injury and Predominance
Aside from proving an actual violation of the antitrust
laws, 136 establishing the injury element of an antitrust claim
tends to be the critical issue of any successful antitrust class
action. 137 Any plaintiff class must put forth a method of
establishing injury that satisfies the predominance requirement
of Rule 23(b)(3). 138 Establishing antitrust injury frequently
involves voluminous testimony from an assertedly qualified
expert. 139 And while the qualification of experts and their
testimony frequently proves to be determinative in its own right
on the issue of proving injury, the inquiry is one that is separate

136. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2018) (outlining the standards to constitute a
violation of the federal antitrust laws).
137. See, e.g., id. § 15(a) (“[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue
therefor in any district court of the United States . . . .”); see also Joshua P.
Davis & Eric L. Cramer, Antitrust, Class Certification, and the Politics of
Procedure, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 969, 970 (2010) (“[T]he decision whether to
certify a class in an antitrust case tends to turn on whether plaintiffs have
proposed a method of proving class-wide injury, or “common impact,” at the
class certification stage.”); In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust
Litig. (Rail Freight III), 934 F.3d 619, 623 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“To establish
liability under [the Clayton Act], each plaintiff must prove not only an
antitrust violation, but also an injury to its business or property and a causal
relation between the two.”).
138. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 622–23 (“The party seeking class
certification must affirmatively demonstrate that the commonality and
predominance requirements are satisfied.” (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350–51 (2011))).
139. See In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight
II), 292 F. Supp. 3d 14, 40–87 (D.D.C. 2017) (engaging in the complex inquiry
of assessing the “relevance of all expert opinions and the reliability of the
experts’ methodology under Daubert”); see also In re Asacol Antitrust Litig.,
907 F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 2018) (relying on expert evidence provided from both
parties regarding “the propriety of class certification”).
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from and must be undertaken prior to the class certification
analysis. 140
Following Supreme Court precedent that at the time
limited the extent to which a court should inquire into merits
issues at the class certification stage, 141 courts historically
viewed the assessment of the plaintiff expert’s method of proof
of injury at the class certification stage to be an inappropriately
premature assessment of the merits. 142 However, the “rigorous
analysis” demanded by Rule 23 post-Wal-Mart and Comcast
seemingly rejected this approach. 143
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart, courts
diverged in their application of the predominance standard to
plaintiffs’ proof of injury. Some courts held that injury need not
be established as to every member of the class, so long as

140. Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 812 (7th
Cir. 2012) (“When an expert’s report or testimony is critical to class
certification, . . . a district court must make a conclusive ruling on any
challenge to that expert’s qualifications . . . before it may rule on a motion for
class certification.”).
141. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974) (“We find
nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any
authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to
determine whether it may be maintained as a class action.”).
142. See, e.g., Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182, 206 (3d Cir. 2011)
(limiting its inquiry at the class certification stage stating that “[the court]
addresses only whether Plaintiffs have provided a method to measure and
quantify damages on a class-wide basis” rather than “determining on the
merits whether the method[] is a just and reasonable inference or
speculative”); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 901 (9th Cir. 1975) (“The Court
made clear in [Eisen] that [the class certification] determination does not
permit or require a preliminary inquiry into the merits.”); In re Lease Oil
Antitrust Litig., 186 F.R.D. 403, 419 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (“In evaluating a motion
for class certification, . . . the court does not have the authority to conduct a
preliminary inquiry into the merits of the case, and hence the substantive
allegations contained in the complaint are accepted as true.” (citing Eisen, 417
U.S. at 177)).
143. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 351 (2011)
(recognizing that the “rigorous analysis will entail some overlap with the
merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim”); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569
U.S. 27, 33–34 (2013) (reiterating that the rigorous analysis “will frequently
entail overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim”).
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“widespread injury to the class” was proven. 144 Others adopted
a more exacting test that required plaintiffs to put forth
“common proof” that established injury as to every member of
the class. 145
Unsurprisingly, courts continue to struggle to come to a
consensus on the applicable standard for this determination in
the wake of Wal-Mart and Comcast. 146 While a few courts retain
the less stringent standard, others have seen Wal-Mart and
Comcast as reason to adopt the more stringent requirement that
injury be shown through “common proof” as to the entire
144. See Meijer, Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Holdings, 246 F.R.D. 293, 310
(D.D.C. 2007) (“[T]he inability to show injury as to a few does not defeat class
certification where the plaintiffs can show widespread injury to the class.”); In
re Nw. Airlines Corp. Antitrust Litig., 208 F.R.D. 174, 223 (E.D. Mich. 2002)
(“The ‘impact’ element of an antitrust claim need not be established as to each
and every class member; rather, it is enough if the plaintiffs’ proposed method
of proof promises to establish ‘widespread injury to the class’ as a result of the
defendant’s antitrust violation.”); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 200
F.R.D. 297, 321 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (“Courts have routinely observed that the
inability to show injury as to a few does not defeat class certification where
the plaintiffs can show widespread injury to the class.”); In re NASDAQ
Mkt-Makers Antitrust Litig., 169 F.R.D. 493, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Even if it
could be shown that some individual class members were not injured, class
certification, nevertheless, is appropriate where the antitrust violation has
cause widespread injury to the class.”).
145. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 311 (3d
Cir. 2008) (“[T]he task for plaintiffs at class certification is to demonstrate that
the element of antitrust impact is capable of proof at trial through evidence
that is common to the class rather than individual to its members.”); Bell Atl.
Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 339 F.3d 294, 302 (5th Cir. 2003) (“We have repeatedly
held that where fact of damage cannot be established for every class member
through proof common to the class, the need to establish antitrust liability for
individual class member defeats Rule 23(b)(3) predominance.”); In re New
Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 28 (1st Cir. 2008)
(finding common proof necessary to show that “each member of the class was
in fact injured” to support a finding of predominance).
146. See generally Chelsey E. Turner, Class Actions: How Easy are They to
Bring, and Why?, 22 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADV. 193 (2017) (surveying the
kinds of analyses that courts go through when determining whether a class
should be certified); Elena Kamenir, Seeking Antitrust Class Certification: The
Role of Individual Damage Calculations in Meeting Class Action
Predominance Requirements, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 199 (2015) (discussing
the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) and whether different methods of damages
calculations defeat the predominance requirement at the class certification
stage).
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class. 147 These dueling theories of the issue represent a schism
in the judiciary’s interpretation of the Supreme Court’s recent
class action jurisprudence. 148 The central question of debate:
how stringent did the Supreme Court make the predominance
standard in the context of antitrust class actions? 149 It seems
that the more lenient standards for proving injury permissible
in the pre-Wal-Mart era may not have survived under the new,
more restricted conception of Rule 23.
The clearest identifiable stress point between the two
contrasting certification standards remains the certification of
classes that contain some (known or unknown) amount of
uninjured putative class members. 150 If there is a new, more
stringent, “common proof” requirement, does it allow for the
existence of uninjured class members in a certified class? 151 This
is a problem that will continue to plague the federal courts as
“it is almost inevitable that [any] class will include some people

147. See e.g., Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 624 (“[P]laintiffs . . . must show
that they can prove, through common evidence, that all class members were
in fact injured by the alleged conspiracy.”).
148. Compare In re Cathode Ray Tube Antitrust Litig., No. C-07-5944-SC,
2013 WL 5391159, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2013) (distinguishing Comcast as
a case where “the plaintiffs’ theory of damages did not map to their theory of
liability so the plaintiffs [in Comcast] failed to show through common evidence
that all class members had been harmed by the alleged conspiracy”), with In
re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 289 F.R.D. 555, 566 (N.D. Cal. 2013)
(“[Q]uestions of impact in this case may call for individualized inquiries that
predominate over common ones, [therefore] the Court finds that Plaintiffs
must demonstrate a method for proving impact on a class-wide basis.”).
149. See In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight
III), 934 F.3d 619, 623 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (analyzing the extent to which the
“hard look required by Rule 23” should delve into the reliability of common
evidence).
150. See id. at 624 (looking to conflicting “cases addressing the question of
when, if ever, a class may include concededly uninjured members” in
determining assess how many individual adjudications are too many for a
court to allow certification under Rule 23).
151. In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., 907 F.3d 42, 58 (1st Cir. 2018)
(questioning whether it would “put the cart before the horse to read Rule 23
to require that a plaintiff demonstrate prior to class certification that each
class member is injured”); Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 624 (recounting the
plaintiffs’ arguments that “predominance does not require common evidence
extending to all class members” (emphasis in original)).
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who have not been injured by the defendant’s conduct.” 152 Even
further, it is common for the plaintiffs’ method for proving
impact itself to reveal that some of the putative class members
remain uninjured by the defendant’s antitrust violation. 153 In
the face of this recurring scenario, it is essential that courts act
uniformly in adopting a reliable standard that conforms with
the principles set forth in the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Wal-Mart and Comcast.
However, the issue of uninjured class members cannot be
solved through merely adopting the more stringent “common
proof” standard. 154 Even after adopting this standard, courts
recognize that it would seem impractical to require injury to
every single putative class member such that the existence of a
single uninjured class member would defeat predominance. 155 Is
it truly necessary that the method of proof show injury to “every
single member” of the putative class? 156 If not, then is there
some amount of uninjured members that would be acceptable
when certifying an antitrust class action? 157 This question leads
courts consider a de minimis exception which would allow
certification in the event of a de minimis amount of uninjured

152. Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 2010).
153. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 623 (noting that “the damages
model . . . indicate[d] that 2,037 members of the proposed class” suffered no
injury).
154. See In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 22 (1st Cir. 2015) (“In
certifying a (b)(3) class there is an almost inevitable tension between excluding
all non-injured parties from the defined class and including all injured parties
in the defined class.”).
155. See, e.g., id. at 23 (noting the “obvious utility of allowing the inclusion
of some uninjured class members in the certified class”); Asacol, 907 F.3d at
58 (“We also agree that it would put the cart before the horse, to read Rule 23
to require that a plaintiff demonstrate prior to class certification that each
class member is injured.”).
156. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 624 (analyzing the plaintiff’s
argument that “predominance does not require common evidence extending to
all class members”); Nexium, 777 F.3d at 21 (“[I]t is difficult to understand
why the presence of uninjured class members at the preliminary stage should
defeat class certification.”).
157. See Asacol, 907 F.3d at 51 (“[T]he question thus becomes: Can a class
be certified in this case even though injury-in-fact will be an individual issue,
the resolution of which will vary among class members?”).
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class members. 158 However, even if one accepts the existence of
the de minimis exception, the question becomes how many
uninjured putative class members would be considered de
minimis and how many uninjured members would prove too
numerous to allow for the proper administration of justice. 159
V.

Proving Antitrust Injury post-Wal-Mart

This Part proceeds in three sections. First, it analyzes
which of the two standards that courts have applied for proof of
injury in antitrust class actions should be applied
post-Wal-Mart and Comcast. It argues that the more stringent
“common proof” standard will be adopted over the less stringent
“widespread impact” standard. Second, this Part analyzes the
de minimis exception as it applies to the “common proof”
standard and reviews judicial analysis of the exception. Third,
in the final section, this Part catalogues the considerations that
courts should find applicable in determining whether the de
minimis exception is satisfied.
A.

Dueling Requirements: “Common Proof” vs “Widespread
Injury”

In the post-Walmart era, courts recognize the Supreme
Court’s holding that Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement
demands a “rigorous analysis” at the class certification stage. 160
This means that district courts are empowered to engage in
significant review of the underlying merits of a class action,
158. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 624 (declining to expressly adopt the
de minimis exception); Nexium, 777 F.3d at 25 (“We think that a certified class
may include a de minimis number of potentially uninjured parties.”).
159. See In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight
II), 292 F. Supp. 3d 14, 135 (D.D.C. 2017) (“The next question is whether the
number of uninjured shippers in the putative class can be considered de
minimis.”); In re Lidoderm Antitrust Litig., No. 14-md-02521, 2017 WL
679367, at *64 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (deciding whether the number of uninjured
members could be considered de minimis).
160. See In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight
III), 934 F.3d 619, 626 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“[C]onfronting such questions [of
determining liability] is part-and-parcel of the ‘hard look’ required by
Wal-Mart and Comcast . . . .”).
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even at the relatively early class certification stage. 161 This
review applies not only to the requirements contained in Rule
23(a), as addressed in Wal-Mart, 162 but also the predominance
requirement of 23(b)(3). 163 “If anything, Rule 23(b)(3)’s
predominance criterion is even more demanding than Rule
23(a).” 164 It then follows, that Wal-Mart and Comcast seem to
require a “rigorous analysis” that will often “overlap with the
merits” of the method by which any putative class of plaintiffs
seeks to establish the element of antitrust impact or injury. 165
Multiple courts of appeals, both before and after Wal-Mart,
embraced this inquisitive posture in the context of antitrust
class actions and required that injury be established as to the
entire class through “common proof” in order to satisfy the
predominance requirement. 166 On the other hand, some courts
161. See id. (“[The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence] does not . . . permit
district courts considering class certification to defer questions about the
number and nature of any individualized inquiries that might be necessary to
establish liability.”).
162. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) (“[The
plaintiff] must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently
numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.” (emphasis in
original)).
163. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 35 (2013) (“The same
analytical principles [as Rule 23(a)] govern Rule 23(b).”).
164. Id.; Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623–24 (1997)
(“Even if Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement may be satisfied . . . the
predominance criterion is far more demanding.”).
165. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 626 (“The party seeking class
certification must affirmatively demonstrate that the . . . predominance
requirement[] is satisfied through . . . a rigorous analysis that will often
overlap with the merits.”); see also Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350 (recognizing that
certification is only proper after a “rigorous analysis” that the prerequisites of
rule 23(a) are required).
166. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 311 (3d
Cir. 2008) (“[T]he task for plaintiffs at class certification is to demonstrate that
the element of antitrust impact is capable of proof at trial through evidence
that is common to the class rather than individual to its members.”); Bell Atl.
Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 339 F.3d 294, 302 (5th Cir. 2003) (“We have repeatedly
held that where fact of damage cannot be established for every class member
through proof common to the class, the need to establish antitrust liability for
individual class member defeats Rule 23(b)(3) predominance.”); In re New
Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 28 (1st Cir. 2008)
(finding common proof necessary to show that “each member of the class was
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continue to certify classes without engaging in the heavy review
authorized by the post-Walmart jurisprudence. 167 These courts
merely required proof of “widespread injury to the class” to meet
predominance. 168 The differences in these two standards
amounts to essentially two different predominance
requirements.
On one hand, the analysis involved in the “common proof”
test imposes a restrictive requirement onto a putative plaintiff
class. 169 The task for the plaintiffs at class certification is to
demonstrate that “the element of antitrust impact is capable of
proof at trial through evidence that is common to the class
rather than individual to its members.” 170 For a class to be
certified, district courts must conduct a “rigorous assessment of
in fact injured” to support a finding of predominance); Rail Freight III, 934
F.3d at 624 (“[P]laintiffs . . . must show that they can prove, through common
evidence, that all class members were in fact injured by the alleged
conspiracy.”).
167. See, e.g., Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802,
811 (7th Cir. 2012) (“In conducting [the class certification] analysis, the court
should not turn the class certification proceedings into a dress rehearsal for
the trial on the merits.”).
168. See Meijer, Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Holdings, 246 F.R.D. 293, 310
(D.D.C. 2007) (“[T]he inability to show injury as to a few does not defeat class
certification where the plaintiffs can show widespread injury to the class.”); In
re Nw. Airlines Corp. Antitrust Litig., 208 F.R.D. 174, 223 (E.D. Mich. 2002)
(“The ‘impact’ element of an antitrust claim need not be established as to each
and every class member; rather, it is enough if the plaintiffs’ proposed method
of proof promises to establish ‘widespread injury to the class’ as a result of the
defendant’s antitrust violation.”); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 200
F.R.D. 297, 321 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (“Courts have routinely observed that the
inability to show injury as to a few does not defeat class certification where
the plaintiffs can show widespread injury to the class.”); In re NASDAQ
Mkt.-Makers Antitrust Litig., 169 F.R.D. 493, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Even if it
could be shown that some individual class members were not injured, class
certification, nevertheless, is appropriate where the antitrust violation has
cause widespread injury to the class.”).
169. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 623 (discussing the demands placed
upon the plaintiffs by Rule 23(b)(3)); see also Pet, supra note 10, at 160
(analyzing the “high burden” demanded by the In re Hydrogen Peroxide court’s
application of the “common proof” requirement).
170. Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311–12; see also Blades v. Monsanto
Co., 400 F.3d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 2005) (“For a class to be certified, plaintiffs
need to demonstrate that common issues prevail as to the existence of . . . the
fact of injury.”).
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the available evidence and the method or methods by which
plaintiffs propose to use the evidence to prove impact at trial.” 171
By this standard, the presence of individualized inquiries into
antitrust injury or impact will defeat predominance and
preclude certification. 172 Consequently, a putative plaintiff class
seemingly will be unable to achieve class certification if its
method for proving injury is unable to establish injury for every
member of the class. 173
On the other hand, the requirement of “widespread injury”
to the class imposes a lighter burden upon a putative class of
plaintiffs. 174 The presence of some individualized inquiries into
impact and injury does not preclude certification. 175 The
171. Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 312.
172. See New Motor Vehicles, 522 F.3d at 20 (“In antitrust class actions,
common issues do not predominate if the fact of antitrust violation and the
fact of antitrust impact cannot be established through common proof.”);
Blades, 400 F.3d at 566 (“If, to make a prima facie showing on a given
questions, the members of a proposed class will need to present evidence that
varies from member to member, then it is an individual question.”); Hydrogen
Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311 (noting that “impact often is critically important for
the purpose of evaluating Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement because
it is an element of the claim that may call for individual, as opposed to
common, proof”); In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail
Freight III), 934 F.3d 619, 627 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“Given the need for at least
2,037 individual determinations of injury and causation, the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying class certification on the ground that
common issues do not predominate.”).
173. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 623 (“Without common proof of injury
and causation, section 4 plaintiffs cannot establish predominance.”); see also
Bell Atl. Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 339 F.3d 294, 302 (5th Cir. 2003) (“We have
repeatedly held that where fact of damage cannot be established for every
class member through proof common to the class, the need to establish
antitrust liability for individual class member defeats Rule 23(b)(3)
predominance.”).
174. See Meijer, 246 F.R.D. at 310 (“[T]he inability to show injury as to a
few does not defeat class certification where the plaintiffs can show
widespread injury to the class.”).
175. See Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 815
(7th Cir. 2012) (“It is well established that the presence of individualized
questions regarding damages does not prevent certification under Rule
23(b)(3).”); Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 801 (7th Cir. 2008) (recognizing
that “the need for individual damages determinations does not, in and of itself,
require denial of [a] motion for certification” under Rule 23(b)(3)); Cardizem,
200 F.R.D. at 319 (“The fact that there may be some individualized questions
pertaining to impact will not defeat class certification.”).
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plaintiff class need not show that impact or injury occurred in
fact, merely that it was susceptible to proof on a “class-wide”
basis. 176 Further, certification could be achieved through
inference of “facts . . . which will tend to establish, perhaps
circumstantially, that each class member was injured.” 177
Rather than a heavy inquiry, the court engages in a more
generalized analysis. 178 Following this standard, courts have
been willing to certify classes even in cases where a number of
putative class members remain uninjured. 179
Despite being presented with this particular issue, 180 the
Supreme Court has yet to specifically clarify which test should
prevail. 181 However, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in the Rail Freight Antitrust Litigation
cases, 182 was recently presented with an opportunity to address
the issue and apply the principles of Wal-Mart and Comcast to
this context. 183 There, the plaintiffs’ damages model indicated
176. See Nw. Airlines, 208 F.R.D. at 223 (“Plaintiffs need not show
antitrust impact in fact occurred on a class-wide basis.” (emphasis in
original)); NASDAQ, 169 F.R.D. at 523 (“Even if it could be shown that some
individual class members were not injured, class certification, nevertheless, is
appropriate where the antitrust violation has caused widespread injury to the
class.”).
177. NASDAQ, 169 F.R.D. at 523.
178. See id. (“The impact element necessitates only an illustration of
generalized inquiry.”); Nw. Airlines, 208 F.R.D. at 223 (requiring only that
injury be only “as a general matter amenable to common proof”).
179. See e.g., Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802,
825 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[I]f a proposed class consists largely (or entirely, for that
matter) of members who are ultimately shown to have suffered no harm, that
may not mean that the class was improperly certified but only that the class
failed to meet its burden of proof on the merits.”).
180. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Tyson Foods, Inc. v.
Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (No. 14-1146) (2016) (asking whether a class may
be certified or maintained when a class consists of some number of uninjured
class members).
181. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1050 (2016)
(finding that the issue was not “fairly presented by th[e] case”).
182. In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight I), 725
F.3d 244 (D.C. Cir. 2013); In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust
Litig. (Rail Freight III), 934 F.3d 619 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
183. See Rail Freight I, 725 F.3d at 253–54 (looking to Comcast to inform
the analysis in the matter before the court); Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 623
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that 2,037 members of the putative class did not suffer an
injury. 184 The Rail Freight court analyzed how the Supreme
Court’s recent class action jurisprudence changed the level of
scrutiny for a class of plaintiffs in the federal courts. 185
In its initial decision, just following the Supreme Court’s
decision in Comcast, the D.C. Circuit established that, “[t]he
plaintiffs must show that they can prove, through common
evidence, that all class members were in fact injured by the
alleged antitrust conspiracy.” 186 The court emphasized the more
stringent standard, requiring that the common evidence
establish injury as to the entire class. 187 Importantly, the Rail
Freight I court took note of the profound restrictive effects of
Comcast on the issues of predominance and antitrust injury. 188
It recounted pre-Comcast decisions in other circuits that
permitted certification even when common proof injury was not
available for every putative class member. 189 With these in
mind, the court concluded that after Comcast it was “now clear,
however, that Rule 23 not only authorizes a hard look at the
soundness of statistical models that purport to show
predominance—it demands it.” 190 The D.C. Circuit remanded

(looking to Wal-Mart and Comcast as two of the “three recent cases [that]
address the contours of th[e] analysis”).
184. Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 624.
185. See id. at 623 (“The parties dispute the extent to which a court, in
conducting the ‘hard look’ required by Rule 23, should assess the reliability of
common evidence.”).
186. Rail Freight I, 725 F.3d at 252 (citing Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591, 623–24 (1997)).
187. See id. (“[W]e do expect the common evidence to show all class
members suffered some injury.” (emphasis in original)).
188. See id. at 255 (“Before [Comcast], the case law was far more
accommodating to class certification under Rule 23(b)(3).”).
189. See id. (noting the “cases from other circuits suggesting that . . . ‘class
certification is not precluded simply because a class may include persons who
have not been injured by the defendant’s conduct’” (quoting Mims v. Stewart
Title Guar. Co., 590 F.3d 298, 308 (5th Cir. 2009); Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt.
Co., 571 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2009))).
190. Id.
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the case so that the lower court could engage in the “common
proof” analysis required by Rule 23(b)(3). 191
After the lower court denied class certification on
remand, 192 the D.C. Circuit heard the matter again. 193 The Rail
Freight III court affirmed the denial of class certification,
reiterating the “common proof” standard, 194 and rejecting the
“widespread impact” standard. 195 Without “common proof” of
injury and causation, “[S]ection 4 plaintiffs cannot establish
predominance.” 196 In coming to this conclusion, the Rail Freight
III court again recounted the three Supreme Court decisions
most pertinent to its analysis, including Wal-Mart and
Comcast. 197 The court justified its application of the “common
proof” standard as a “rigorous analysis” of the plaintiff’s method
of proof:
[The Supreme Court] does not, as the plaintiffs here contend,
permit district courts considering class certification to defer
questions about the number and nature of any individualized
inquiries that might be necessary to establish liability. To the
contrary, confronting such questions is part-and-parcel of the hard
look required by Wal-Mart and Comcast, as recognized even by
those courts permitting a class to include some small number of
concededly uninjured individuals. 198

As reflected in the D.C. Circuit’s analysis in the Rail Freight
Litigation, the less stringent “widespread injury” standard does
not fulfill the required “rigorous analysis” of Wal-Mart and

191. See id. (“[W]e vacate the district court’s class certification decision
and remand the case to permit the district court to reconsider its decision in
light of Comcast Corp v. Behrend.”).
192. In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight II),
292 F. Supp. 3d 14, 145 (D.D.C. 2017).
193. In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight III),
934 F.3d 619 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
194. See id. at 624 (“[P]laintiffs, to establish predominance, must show
that they can prove, through common evidence, that all class members were
in fact injured by the alleged conspiracy.”).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 623.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 626.
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Comcast. 199 In contrast, the “common proof” standard allows the
district court to properly engage in the analysis now required by
Rule 23. 200 Additionally, the goal of the predominance
requirement is to avoid inefficient or unfair aggregation of
claims. 201 The more stringent “common proof” standard better
serves this goal by taking into account whether individual
inquiries into injury and impact would defeat predominance. 202
Even more recently, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reaffirmed its use of the “common proof” standard in the
In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation. 203
There, the Third Circuit emphasized the rigorous analysis
necessary and rejected an impermissible “reli[ance] on
averages” to show “common proof of injury” at the class
certification stage. 204 The Lamictal court followed the much
cited pre-Wal-Mart case, In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust

199. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 35–36 (2013) (stating that
under the widespread injury standard “any method of measurement is
acceptable so long as it can be applied classwide, . . . reduc[ing] Rule 23(b)(3)’s
requirement to a nullity”).
200. See In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight
I), 725 F.3d 244, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“[I]t is now indisputably the role of the
district court to scrutinize the evidence before granting certification, . . . [i]f
the damages model cannot withstand this scrutiny then, that is not just a
merits issue.”).
201. See In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., 907 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir. 2018) (“The
aim of the predominance inquiry is to test whether any dissimilarity among
the claims of class members can be dealt with in a manner that is not
inefficient or unfair.”); see also id. (“Inefficiency can be pictured as a line of
thousands of class members waiting their turn to offer testimony and evidence
on individual issues.”).
202. See Rail Freight I, 725 F.3d at 255 (observing that after Comcast the
district court should “consider the damages model’s flaw in its certification
decision”).
203. See In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 957 F.3d 184,
191 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[I]t suffices if [the direct purchasers] show that injury is
capable of common proof at trial.” (emphasis added)).
204. See id. at 192–94 (vacating class certification and remanding “for the
District Court to analyze the evidence and arguments” under the proper
standard).
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Litigation, 205 in coming to its conclusion. 206 Hydrogen Peroxide
had been one of the first courts to announce the “common proof”
standard in the context of antitrust class actions and was
continuously followed by the Third Circuit over the years. 207 The
Lamictal decision reaffirms the Third Circuit’s commitment to
the “common proof” standard and signals to other courts that
the standard is the only way to properly conduct the rigorous
analysis required at the class certification stage.
Moving forward with these principles in mind, it is likely
that courts will follow the D.C. Circuit in Rail Freight, the Third
Circuit in Lamictal, as well as other pre-Comcast courts, 208 in
adopting the “common proof” standard.
B.

Recognizing a De Minimis Exception

Once courts adopt the more stringent predominance
analysis requiring “common proof” of injury in antitrust class
actions, they still must face the frequently occurring problem of
some amount of uninjured class members. In almost any class
action, especially in the context of antitrust actions, it is
possible—if not outright probable—that some number of class
members will remain uninjured by the defendant’s antitrust

205. 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008).
206. See Lamictal, 957 F.3d at 191 (following the “longstanding rule
announced in Hydrogen Peroxide, . . . that a putative class must demonstrate
that its claims are capable of common proof at trial by a preponderance of the
evidence”).
207. See Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311–12 (“[T]he task for plaintiffs
at class certification is to demonstrate that the element of antitrust impact is
capable of proof at trial through evidence that is common to the class rather
than individual to its members.”); see also Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC,
687 F.3d 583, 601 (3d Cir. 2012) (“A plaintiff must ‘demonstrate that the
element of [the legal claim] is capable of proof at trial through evidence that
is common to the class rather than individual to its members.’” (quoting
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311) (alteration in original))); In re Modafinil
Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 238, 262–63 (3d Cir. 2016) (“The class should only
be certified ‘if such impact is . . . susceptible to proof at trial through available
evidence common to the class.’” (quoting Hydrogen Peroxide, 522 F.3d at 325)).
208. See In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522
F.3d 6, 20 (1st Cir. 2008) (adopting the “common proof” standard); Blades v.
Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562, 572 (8th Cir. 2005) (same).
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violation. 209 This problem becomes exacerbated when it is clear
at the class certification stage that some number of putative
class members are, in fact, uninjured. 210 As a result, even in
adopting the rigorous “common proof” test that will likely
become the norm, courts must still determine how to resolve this
seemingly frequent issue. 211 Some courts respond by adopting a
de minimis exception, in which class certification would still be
appropriate so long as the number of uninjured members is de
minimis 212 or not a great many. 213 There is a small but
informative sample of federal courts that have addressed the
presence of the de minimis exception in the post-Comcast era. 214

209. See Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 2010) (“While
it is almost inevitable that a class will include some people who have not been
injured by the defendant’s conduct because at the outset of the case many
members may be unknown . . . this possibility does not preclude class
certification.”).
210. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 813 (5th Cir. 2014)
(“[C]lass certification is not precluded simply because a class may include
persons who have not been injured by the defendant’s conduct . . . the
possibility that some may fail to prevail on their individual claims will not
defeat class membership.”).
211. See In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., 907 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir. 2018) (“Can
a class be certified in this case even though injury-in-fact will be an individual
issue, the resolution of which will vary among class members?”); In re Rail
Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight III), 934 F.3d 619, 623
(D.C. Cir. 2019) (“[T]he damages model . . . indicates that 2,037 members of
the proposed class—or 12.7 percent—suffered only negative overcharges and
thus no injury from any conspiracy.”).
212. See De Minimis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining de
minimis as a fact or thing “so insignificant that a court may overlook it in
deciding an issue or case”).
213. See In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 25 (1st Cir. 2015)
(holding that “a certified class may include a de minimis number of potentially
uninjured parties”); Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d
802, 825 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[A] class should not be certified if it is apparent that
it contains a great many persons who have suffered no injury at the hands of
the defendant.”); Torres v. Mercer Canyons Inc., 835 F.3d 1125, 1137 (9th Cir.
2016) (“[A] fortuitous non-injury to a subset of class members does not
necessarily defeat certification of the entire class.”).
214. See In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight
II), 292 F. Supp. 3d 14, 133 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“A number of other circuit and
district courts have addressed the question of uninjured class members at
class certification post-Comcast . . . .”).
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The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit first addressed
the possibility of the de minimis exception in the Nexium
Antitrust Litigation. 215 There, the district court certified a class
of plaintiffs alleging that a pharmaceutical company engaged in
certain anticompetitive behavior and thus the price of the drug
Nexium was artificially inflated. 216 The defendants challenged
certification on appeal, arguing that the “common proof”
standard precluded certification when some of the class
members did not suffer an injury due to the anticompetitive
behavior, as was the case there. 217 The Nexium court rejected
the defendant’s argument and affirmed the lower court’s grant
of class certification, expressly adopting the de minimis
exception. 218
The Nexium court noted the recurring nature of the
“tension” that courts face in certifying class actions. 219
“Excluding all uninjured class members at the certification
stage is almost impossible in many cases, given the
inappropriateness of certifying . . . a class defined in terms of
legal injury.” 220 Accordingly, the court concluded that it would
be unreasonable to require plaintiffs to make a showing that “is
simply not possible . . . at the class certification stage.” 221
Further, the First Circuit found that rejecting a de minimis
exception would “run counter to fundamental class action
policies.” 222 The purpose of class action law is to achieve
efficiencies not found in repeated individual litigations about

215. See In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 22 (1st Cir. 2015)
(questioning whether “the presence of uninjured class members at the
preliminary stage should defeat class certification”).
216. Id. at 13–14.
217. Id. at 14.
218. Id. at 25.
219. See id. at 22 (“In certifying a (b)(3) class there is an almost inevitable
tension between excluding all non-injured parties from the defined class and
including all injured parties in the defined class.”).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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the same matter. 223 Moreover, the primary class contemplated
by Rule 23(b)(3) is the class in which a large number of
individuals have suffered a relatively small amount of
damages. 224 Absent a de minimis exception, it would be nearly
impossible to certify a class consisting of “the very group that
Rule 23(b)(3) was intended to protect.” 225
Subsequently, in the In re Asacol Antitrust Litigation, 226 the
First Circuit again encountered the presence of uninjured
putative class members, but this time in much larger
numbers. 227 There, the district court certified the class and
determined that the Nexium decision allowed for a finding that
the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) had been satisfied despite the
large amount of uninjured class members. 228 This time around
the First Circuit reversed and decertified the class, 229
disapproving of the lower court’s reading of Nexium. 230 The
Asacol court distinguished Nexium stating that Asacol was “a
case in which any class member may be uninjured, and there
[were] apparently thousands who in fact suffered no injury. The
need to identify those individuals will predominate and render
an adjudication unmanageable . . . .” 231 Importantly, however,
and despite further limiting the scope of Nexium on grounds

223. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615 (1997) (“[T]he
Advisory Committee sought to cover cases in which a class action would
achieve economies of time, effort, and expense . . . .”).
224. See Nexium, 777 F.3d at 23 (noting the purpose of Rule 23(b)(3) as the
“vindication of the rights of groups of people who individually would be
without effective strength to bring their opponents to court at all”).
225. Id.
226. 907 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2018).
227. Id. at 45–47; see id. at 51 (“Plaintiffs’ class nevertheless includes
consumers who would have continued to purchase a brand drug for various
reasons, even if a cheaper, generic version had been available.”).
228. See id. at 52 (“The district court in this case sought to track Nexium,
finding that prior to judgment, it will be possible to establish a mechanism for
distinguishing the injured from the uninjured class members.”).
229. Id. at 58.
230. See id. at 53 (disagreeing with the district court that “Nexium
blesse[d]” the class certification at issue).
231. Id. at 53–54.
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discussed below, 232 the First Circuit signaled that it would still
remain open to certifying classes in which a de minimis
exception would apply. 233 Unfortunately for the putative class,
this was not an instance in which the exception could be
satisfied and consequently, in the court’s opinion, the class was
uncertifiable. 234
The D.C. Circuit similarly discussed the de minimis
exception in the Rail Freight Antitrust Litigation. 235 On remand
from Rail Freight I, the district court interpreted the earlier
appellate decision requiring “common proof” to allow for a de
minimis exception. 236 The district court stated that a de minimis
number of class members requiring individualized proof of
injury and causation would not preclude a finding of
predominance, 237 although it found that the particular
circumstances there did not satisfy the requirements of the
exception. 238 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the lower
court’s ruling, while avoiding an express adoption of the de

232. See infra Part V.C (analyzing the Asacol court’s rejection of Nexium
based on the “winnowing mechanism” used in Nexium).
233. See Asacol, 907 F.3d at 53 (“Relatedly, this is not a case in which a
very small absolute number of class members might be picked off in a
manageable, individualized process at or before trial.”).
234. See id. at 53–54 (finding that the need to identify uninjured class
members will “predominate” and render adjudication “unmanageable”).
235. See In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight
III), 934 F.3d 619, 623–26 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (analyzing the problem presented
by the “2,037 class members for whom [the plaintiffs’] damages model shows
no injury”).
236. See id. at 624 (“[T]he district court held that our opinion did not
require common evidence of injury to all class members.”); see also In re Rail
Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight II), 292 F. Supp. 3d. 14,
135 (D.D.C. 2017) (“If the putative class includes only a de minimis number of
uninjured members, then plaintiffs have satisfied the . . . standard for
predominance and have demonstrated that they can prove class-wide injury
through common evidence at trial.”).
237. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 624 (recounting that the district court
“agreed with the plaintiffs that common proof covering virtually all members
of the proposed class” would be permissible for certification).
238. Id.

NO INJURY? NO CLASS

1415

minimis exception. 239 The D.C. Circuit found that even
“assum[ing] that the district court correctly recognized a de
minimis exception,” 240 the number of uninjured class members
was too numerous to meet the exception. 241 However, the Rail
Freight III court suggested that a case in which fewer class
members remained uninjured might well prompt the court to
expressly adopt the exception. 242
Finally, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
addressed the situation of uninjured class members in Torres v.
Mercer Canyons Inc. 243 There, although the court did not
expressly mention the de minimis exception, the Ninth Circuit
adopted a standard that largely mirrors the de minimis
exception. 244 In Torres, the defendant claimed that the presence
of “certain ‘non-injured’ individuals” defeated predominance. 245
The Torres court concluded that “such fortuitous non-injury to a
subset of class members does not necessarily defeat certification
of the entire class . . . .” 246 “[A] flaw that may defeat
predominance [would be] the existence of large numbers of class
members who were never exposed to the challenged conduct to
begin with.” 247 As “the district court is well situated to winnow
out those non-injured members,” 248 the Torres court affirmed
class certification. 249
As reflected by these decisions post-Comcast, the de
minimis exception has not been expressly adopted by many of
239. See id. (“For the sake of argument, we assume that the district court
correctly recognized a de minimis exception to the general rule
that . . . causation and injury must be ‘capable of class-wide resolution.’”
(citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011))).
240. Id. at 625.
241. Id. at 625–26.
242. See id. at 627 (declining to create “the first such case” in which
“thousands of class members testify”).
243. 835 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016).
244. See id. at 1136–37 (allowing certification despite “the possibility that
an injurious course of conduct may sometimes fail to cause injury to certain
class members”).
245. Id. at 1137.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1136 (emphasis in original).
248. Id. at 1137.
249. Id. at 1142.
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courts. This is largely due to the fact that many courts
previously followed the less rigorous “widespread impact” test,
which of course had no reason (or need) for a de minimis
exception as it is built into the “widespread impact” test. 250 De
minimis was encapsulated by the notion that only “a great
many” uninjured class members would preclude class
certification. 251 It is only now that the more rigorous “common
proof” test dominates that a de minimis exception is relevant. 252
However, despite its unclear status currently, it is likely that
the de minimis exception will be adopted by courts that apply
the “common proof” test as there are clear benefits that the
exception grants a court engaging in the rigorous analysis
demanded in the post-Walmart era. 253 Similarly, the courts that
had previously favored the less stringent “widespread” test will
clearly favor the de minimis exception as it fits their previous
jurisprudence better than demanding 100% of class members to
prove injury on a common basis. 254 Consequently, the de
minimis exception will become the norm circuit-wide when
assessing predominance in the context of antitrust injury.
C.

What is Considered De Minimis?

Although the de minimis exception will likely be adopted
across the board, the question still remains as to how many
uninjured members is too many? In other words, how must a
250. See In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight
II), 292 F. Supp. 3d 14, 135 (D.D.C. 2017) (recognizing that the “all or virtually
all” standard and the “de minimis” standard as “two sides of the same coin”).
251. See, e.g., Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802,
825 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[A] class should not be certified if it is apparent that it
contains a great many persons who have suffered no injury at the hands of the
defendant.”).
252. See Rail Freight II, 292 F. Supp. 3d at 134 (sifting through the
relevant post-Comcast case law to determine whether a de minimis exception
is necessary to be included in the analysis); In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge
Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight III), 934 F.3d 619, 624 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
(recognizing that the de minimis exception would not require “common
evidence of injury to all class members”).
253. See In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 23–24 (1st Cir. 2015)
(noting the “obvious utility” and “efficiency” of the de minimis exception).
254. See Rail Freight II, 292 F. Supp. 3d at 134 (analyzing the effects of
the de minimis exception in the context of “widespread impact”).
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court measure the quantity of problematic class members in
order to determine whether the exception is satisfied? What are
the limits of the de minimis exception? 255 Most courts
recognizing the exception are hesitant to place a hard, clear
outer bound on the exception. 256
However, a few principles become apparent in reading
discussions of the de minimis exception. First, the application of
the de minimis exception must be structured in the context of
the “common proof” standard and the predominance inquiry. 257
Courts look to various factors as relevant to determining
whether the number of uninjured members is de minimis or
instead would frustrate predominance. 258 Second, a “winnowing
mechanism” used to determine which putative class members
fall in the de minimis uninjured group is required. 259
Importantly, this “winnowing mechanism” must be protective of
defendant’s Seventh Amendment and Due Process rights. 260
Primarily, what qualifies as a de minimis deviation “from a
prescribed standard must, of course, be determined with
reference to the purpose of the standard.” 261 Thus, the de
minimis exception to the “common proof” standard must be

255. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 624 (“[W]hen does the need for
individualized proof of injury and causation destroy predominance?”).
256. See id. (rejecting the approach of some courts which “arbitrarily
imposed a six-percent upper limit on the percentage of uninjured parties who
may be included in a certified class”).
257. See Nexium, 777 F.3d at 30–31 (emphasizing the role of predominance
in construing the de minimis exception).
258. See Rail Freight II, 292 F. Supp. 3d at 135–38 (analyzing whether the
amount of uninjured class members in the matter was encompassed by the de
minimis exception).
259. See Nexium, 777 F.3d at 19 (“At the class certification stage, the court
must be satisfied that, prior to judgment, it will be possible to establish a
mechanism for distinguishing the injured from the uninjured.”).
260. See In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., 907 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2018) (“[A]
class may be certified notwithstanding the need to adjudicate individual issues
so long as the proposed adjudication will be both administratively feasible and
protective of defendants’ Seventh Amendment and Due Process rights.”).
261. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 232
(1992).
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structured with the predominance inquiry in mind. 262 If an
amount of uninjured class members is to be considered de
minimis, the issues “common to [the] class” must still
“predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members.” 263 Accordingly, the number of uninjured members
must not be large enough to “render the class impractical or
improper, or to cause noncommon issues to predominate.” 264 If
the putatively de minimis uninjured class members truly do not
frustrate predominance then “the addition or subtraction of any
of the plaintiffs to or from the class [should not] have a
substantial effect on the substance or quantity of evidence
offered.” 265
In following this principle, courts look to various factors
when determining whether any number of uninjured class
members can be considered de minimis. 266 Assessing each
factor, the district court seeks to determine whether the
presence of the uninjured class members would defeat
predominance. 267 First, although no court has adopted a hard
and fast rule of percentages, the district courts that have found
the de minimis exception satisfied suggest that 6 percent
represents the upper bound of the de minimis exception. 268
Multiple courts have denied certification to classes with
262. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 626 (determining whether an amount
of uninjured class members was de minimis in light of the predominance
inquiry).
263. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
264. In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 31 (1st Cir. 2015); see
Asacol, 907 F.3d at 51 (“The aim of the predominance inquiry is to test whether
any dissimilarity among the claims of class members can be dealt with in a
manner that is not inefficient or unfair.”).
265. Nexium, 777 F.3d at 30 (quoting Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d
1256, 1270 (11th Cir. 2009)).
266. See In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight
II), 292 F. Supp. 3d 14, 135–40 (D.D.C. 2017) (looking to multiple factors to
determine whether the number of uninjured class members was de minimis).
267. See Nexium, 777 F.3d at 31 (asking whether the number of uninjured
class members causes “non-common issues to predominate”).
268. See In re Lidoderm Antitrust Litig., No. 14-md-02521, 2017 WL
679367, at *12 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (finding the three uninjured class members de
minimis in comparison (5.5 percent) to the class size of fifty-five); Rail Freight
II, 292 F. Supp. 3d at 137 (noting that the few decisions “suggest that 5% to
6% constitutes the outer limits of a de minimis” exception).
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uninjured members that account for more than this
percentage. 269 Second, in addition to percentages, courts also
look to the raw number of uninjured class members. 270 Thus far,
only classes containing uninjured members amounting to single
digits have ever achieved certification under the de minimis
exception. 271
Finally, even apart from determining whether the actual
number of uninjured members is de minimis or not, courts must
also determine whether the uninjured members can be
identified and severed from the rest of the class members. 272
This is necessary as the class members uninjured by the
defendant’s antitrust violation cannot recover monetary
damages. 273 Multiple courts have struggled to find an effective
method of distinguishing between the uninjured and injured
The
decision
rests
on
balancing
an
members. 274
“administratively feasible” method with the Seventh

269. See In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight
III), 934 F.3d 619, 625 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (finding that a number of uninjured
members constituting 12.7 percent of the class precluded a finding of
predominance); Asacol, 907 F.3d at 50–52 (finding that a number of uninjured
members constituting approximately 10 percent of the class to preclude a
finding of predominance).
270. See Rail Freight II, 292 F. Supp. 3d at 137 (“Beyond percentages, the
number of uninjured class members in relationship to the size of the class also
may matter.”).
271. See Lidoderm, 2017 WL 679367, at *12 (finding three uninjured class
members to be de minimis).
272. See Nexium, 777 F.3d at 19 (“At the class certification stage, the court
must be satisfied that, prior to judgment, it will be possible to establish a
mechanism for distinguishing the injured from the uninjured class
members.”).
273. See id. (“[T]he payout of the amount for which the defendants were
held liable must be limited to injured parties.”); Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at
623 (“To establish liability under [the Clayton Act], each plaintiff must prove
not only an antitrust violation, but also an injury to its business or property
as a casual relation between the two.”).
274. See In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., 907 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir. 2018)
(noting the need to find a “winnowing mechanism”); Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d
at 625 (determining whether an adequate “winnowing mechanism” existed
such that class certification would not be precluded).
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Amendment and Due Process rights of the defendants. 275 No
decision to date illustrates what kind of method would be
acceptable based on these considerations. 276 However, the First
Circuit has discussed the matter and articulated the relevant
factors of administrative feasibility and consciousness of
Seventh Amendment and Due Process concerns. 277
In its decision in the Nexium Antitrust Litigation, the First
Circuit recognized that unrebutted affidavits filed by members
of the plaintiff class could serve as a feasible method of
separating the injured from uninjured. 278 There, AstraZeneca,
the producer of Nexium, allegedly entered into noncompete
agreements with three generic drug companies forestalling
their marketing of generic forms of Nexium. 279 The putative
class alleged that this anticompetitive behavior harmed the
class by frustrating the production of a generic alternative, thus
raising prices. 280 However, it was made clear through expert
testimony that some percentage of the putative class members
were not injured by the conspiracy because they would not have
switched to the generic drug even if it had been available. 281
As stated above, despite the presence of possibly uninjured
class members the district court certified the plaintiff class. 282
Essential to certification was the existence of a “winnowing
275. See Asacol, 907 F.3d at 52 (“[A] class may be certified notwithstanding
the need to adjudicate individual issues so long as the proposed adjudication
will be both administratively feasible and protective of defendants’ Seventh
Amendment and Due Process rights.”).
276. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 625 (rejecting rebuttable affidavits
as an acceptable “winnowing mechanism” and discussing the standard a
possible mechanism must satisfy).
277. Asacol, 907 F.3d at 52.
278. See In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 20 (1st Cir. 2015) (“[I]f
such consumer testimony would be sufficient to establish injury in an
individual suit, it follows that similar testimony in the form of an affidavit or
declaration would be sufficient in a class action.”).
279. Id. at 14.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 17.
282. See id. (“The district court below concluded that plaintiffs had
sufficiently demonstrated a showing of adequacy of representation and
predominance of common questions to the class to meet the requirements of
class certification under Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3).”).
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mechanism” suggested by the plaintiffs in order to determine
which putative class members were uninjured. 283 Affirming the
lower court, 284 the Nexium court stated clearly that “[t]he court
may proceed with certification so long as [the winnowing]
mechanism will be administratively feasible, and protective of
defendants’ Seventh Amendment and due process rights.” 285
The First Circuit found that the winnowing mechanism of
unrebutted affidavits by each class members was sufficient. 286
Four years later, the First Circuit sharply limited the
Nexium decision in the Asacol Antitrust Litigation. 287 Asacol
presented a similar yet slightly distinct factual scenario. 288 In
Asacol a putative class of plaintiffs sued a pharmaceutical
company alleging that the company engaged in anticompetitive
“product hopping.” 289 “Product hopping” occurs when a
pharmaceutical company switches out a popular brand-name
product with a short patent-life for a substantially similar
brand-name product with a long patent-life remaining. 290 This
technique frustrates producers of generic products because a
“reference brand name drug” is required for a generic to be
introduced into the market. 291 However, similar to Nexium, it
was revealed by expert testimony that over 10 percent of the
class members were likely uninjured by the defendant’s

283. Id. at 19.
284. Id. at 32 (“The district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying
the [putative] class of plaintiffs.”).
285. Id. at 19.
286. See id. at 21 (“[W]e have confidence that a mechanism would exist for
establishing injury at the liability stage of this case, compliant with the
requirements of the Seventh Amendment and due process.” (citing Madison v.
Chalmette Refining, LLC, 637 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2011))).
287. In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., 907 F.3d 42, 58 (1st Cir. 2018).
288. Id. at 45–47.
289. Id.
290. See id. at 46 (“[B]y pulling Asacol, [the pharmaceutical company]
effectively prevented generic drugs that would have used Asacol as a reference
drug from entering the market after the expiration of Asacol’s patents.”).
291. See id. (“[Defendant’s] aim in pulling Asacol from the market and
introducing Delzicol was to preclude the possibility of market entry of generic
drugs . . . .”).
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behavior because they would not have switched to a generic
alternative even if the “product hopping” had not occurred. 292
In contrast to its decision in Nexium, the First Circuit held
that unrebutted affidavits did not satisfy the two conditions
required for establishing a winnowing mechanism. 293 The court
emphasized that class certification could not ignore the basic
and foundational principles contained in Due Process and the
Seventh Amendment. 294 The Asacol court made clear, “the
district court must at the time of certification offer a reasonable
and workable plan for how that opportunity will be provided in
a manner that is protective of the defendant’s constitutional
rights and does not cause individual inquiries to overwhelm
common issues.” 295 The plaintiff’s attempt to use affidavits as a
winnowing mechanism was sharply rejected. 296 The court looked
to the fact that, unlike in Nexium, the defendant in Asacol
sought to challenge the affidavits, thus requiring “individual
trials because genuinely contested affidavits do not support
summary judgment and are inadmissible.” 297 There, the court
made abundantly clear that it was not willing to sacrifice the
defendant’s substantive rights for the sake of certifying the
putative class. 298
292. See id. at 47 (recounting that the district court presumed that “by the
end of the relevant period, somewhere around 10% of the class members would
have opted for [the brand name drug] even in the presence of [the generic]”).
293. See id. at 53 (“A claims administrator’s review of contested forms
completed by consumers concerning an element of their claims would fail to be
protective of defendants’ Seventh Amendment and due process rights.”).
294. See id. (“The fact that plaintiffs seek class certification provides no
occasion for jettisoning the rules of evidence and procedure, the Seventh
Amendment, or the dictate of the Rules Enabling Act . . . .” (citing Tyson
Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1048 (2016))).
295. Id. at 58; see id. at 55 (“Whether that opportunity precludes class
certification turns on whether such challenges are reasonably plausible in a
given case and whether the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that allowing for such
challenges in a manner that protects the defendant’s rights will be
manageable and superior to the alternatives.”).
296. See id. at 58 (finding that the “plaintiffs ha[d] plainly not enabled the
district court to articulate” a plan that would satisfy the court’s requirements).
297. Id.
298. See In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., 907 F.3d 42, 56 (1st Cir. 2018)
(recognizing that the court has “no license to create a Rule 23(b)(3) class in
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VI. Conclusion
Effective enforcement of the federal antitrust laws is key to
protecting the United States free market. 299 Absent a purposeful
deterrent, potential market power abusers will remain
unfettered in their actions, resulting in long-term negative
effects on the American economy. 300 The goals of the Sherman
Act simply cannot be achieved without the proper functioning of
every aspect of antitrust enforcement. Accordingly, the “private
attorneys general,” 301 must be able to efficiently bring claims
against and challenge the resources of the powerful goliaths
that frequently commit antitrust violations. 302 The class action
mechanism serves to empower the antitrust plaintiff by
allowing the large-scale aggregation of what normally amounts
to relatively small individual claims. 303
We have yet to witness the full effects of the Supreme
Court’s post-Wal-Mart jurisprudence, though it is clear that the
days of “certify now, ask questions later,” are over. 304 A putative
every negative value case by either altering or reallocating substantive claims
or departing from the rules of evidence”).
299. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746–47 (1977) (recognizing
the goal of “deterring violators and depriving them of the fruits of their
illegality” reflected in the antitrust laws); N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v.
FTC, 574 U.S. 494, 502 (2015) (“Federal antitrust law is a central safeguard
for the Nation’s free market structure.”).
300. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 56–57 (1911)
(discussing fears that monopoly would “restrain the free flow of commerce and
tend to bring about the evils, such as enhancement of prices, which were
considered to be against public policy”).
301. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972).
302. See Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 746 (“[T]he legislative purpose in
creating a group of ‘private attorneys general’ to enforce the antitrust laws.”
(quoting Hawaii, 405 U.S. at 262)).
303. In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 23 (1st Cir. 2015) (noting
the purpose of Rule 23(b)(3) as the “vindication of the rights of groups of people
who individually would be without effective strength to bring their opponents
to court at all”); California v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701–02 (1979) (“[T]he
Rule 23 class-action device was designed to allow an exception to the usual
rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named
parties only.”).
304. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) (“Rule
23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard.”); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,
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class of antitrust plaintiffs must “affirmatively demonstrate”
that its method of proving class-wide injury meets the
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). 305 It is not enough that the
plaintiffs establish “widespread impact” to the class, as now
“common proof” of injury as to the entire class is required. 306 But
even under this more stringent standard, it is impractical for
courts to require 100 percent of the class members to prove
injury at the class certification stage. 307 Consequently, the de
minimis exception will function as an escape hatch to allow
certification when the number of potentially uninjured class
members does not frustrate predominance. 308 So long as
common questions continue to predominate over individualized
ones, the presence of a de minimis amount of uninjured class
members will not preclude certification. 309 Further, it is key that
the “winnowing mechanism” used to sever uninjured class
569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013) (“[I]t may be necessary for the court to probe behind the
pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question . . . .”).
305. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350 (“A party seeking class certification
must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule . . . .”); Comcast,
569 U.S. at 33 (requiring the party to “affirmatively demonstrate” compliance
with Rule 23); In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight
III), 934 F.3d 619, 624 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (requiring “common affirmative
evidence . . . that a conspiracy did in fact injure” the class members).
306. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 623 (“Without common proof of injury
and causation, section 4 plaintiffs cannot establish predominance.” (citing
Comcast, 569 U.S. at 36–38)).
307. See Nexium, 777 F.3d at 22 (“[I]t is simply not possible to entirely
separate the injured from the uninjured at the class certification stage.”); Pella
Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 2010) (“While it is almost
inevitable that a class will include some people who have not been injured by
the defendant’s conduct because at the outset of the case many members may
be unknown . . . this possibility does not preclude class certification.”).
308. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 624 (questioning whether “common
proof covering virtually all members of the proposed class, and leaving only a
de minimis number of cases requiring individualized proof of injury . . . would
be enough to show predominance”); Wis. Dep’t of Revenue v. William Wrigley,
Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 232 (1992) (stating that a de minimis deviation “from a
prescribed standard must, of course, be determined with reference to the
purpose of the standard”).
309. See Nexium, 777 F.3d at 30 (“[I]f common issues truly predominate
over individualized issues in a lawsuit, then the addition or subtraction of any
of the plaintiffs to or from the class [should not] have a substantial effect on
substance or quantity of evidence offered.” (internal quotations omitted)).
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members be “administratively feasible” and protective of the
defendant’s Seventh Amendment and Due Process rights.
The “common proof” standard combined with the de
minimis exception strikes an important balance between the
goals of Wal-Mart’s “rigorous analysis” and the goals of antitrust
enforcement. While the “common proof” standard allows courts
to fully engage with the plaintiffs’ method of proving class-wide
injury, 310 the de minimis exception provides for certification in
the cases most essential to private antitrust enforcement:
instances of relatively minute injuries spread over a large
number of individuals. 311 Adhering to this balance through
proper administration of the de minimis exception will solve the
uncertainty currently plaguing the antitrust class action bar. In
turn, the “private attorneys general,” tasked with aiding in
antitrust enforcement, will truly be able to fulfill their role in
protecting the free market of the United States.

310. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 626 (“[C]onfronting such questions is
part-and-parcel of the ‘hard look’ required by Wal-Mart and Comcast . . . .”).
311. See Nexium, 777 F.3d at 22 (“[T]he Advisory Committee sought to
cover cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, effort, and
expense, and promote . . . uniformity of decision as to persons similarly
situation.” (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615 (1997))).

